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Abstract
Financial innovations are a common explanation for the rise in credit card debt
and bankruptcies. To evaluate this story, we develop a simple model that incor-
porates two key frictions: asymmetric information about borrowers’ risk of default
and a fixed cost of developing each contract lenders offer. Innovations that amelio-
rate asymmetric information or reduce this fixed cost have large extensive margin
effects via the entry of new lending contracts targeted at riskier borrowers. This
results in more defaults and borrowing, and increased dispersion of interest rates.
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances and Federal Reserve Board interest rate
data, we find evidence supporting these predictions. Specifically, the dispersion of
credit card interest rates nearly tripled while the “new” cardholders of the late 1980s
and 1990s had riskier observable characteristics than existing cardholders. Our cal-
culation suggest these new cardholders accounted for over 25% of the rise in bank
credit card debt and delinquencies between 1989 and 1998.
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1 Introduction
Financial innovations are frequently cited as a key factor in the dramatic increase in
households’ access to credit cards between 1980 and 2000. By making intensive use of
improved information technology, lenders were able to price risk more accurately and
to offer loans more closely tailored to the risk characteristics of different groups (Mann
2006; Baird 2007). The expansion in credit card borrowing, in turn, is thought to be a key
force driving the surge in consumer bankruptcy filings and unsecured borrowing (see
Figure 1) over the past thirty years (White 2007).
Surprisingly little theoretical work, however, has explored the implications of finan-
cial innovations for unsecured consumer loans. We help fill this gap by developing
an incomplete markets model of bankruptcy to analyze the qualitative implications of
improved credit technology. To guide us in assessing the model’s predictions, we doc-
ument that many key innovations in the U.S. credit card industry occurred during the
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. This leads us to compare the model’s predictions to cross-
sectional data on the evolution of credit card debt and interest rates during these years.
Our model incorporates two frictions that are key in shaping credit contracts: asym-
metric information about borrowers’ default risk, and a fixed cost of creating a credit
contract. While asymmetric information is a common element of credit models, fixed
costs of contract design have been largely ignored by the academic literature.1 This is
surprising, as texts targeted at practitioners document significant fixed costs. According
to Lawrence and Solomon (2002), a prominent consumer credit handbook, developing a
consumer lending product involves selecting the target market, designing the terms and
conditions of the product and scorecards to assess applicants, testing the product, fore-
casting profitability, and preparing formal documentation. Even after the initial launch,
there are ongoing overhead costs, such as regular reviews of the product design and
scorecards as well as maintenance of customer databases, that vary little with the num-
ber of customers. Finally, it is worth noting that fixed costs are consistent with the obser-
vation that consumer credit contracts are differentiated but rarely individual-specific.
We incorporate these frictions into a two-period model that builds on the classic con-
tribution of Jaffee and Russell (1976). The economy is populated by a continuum of
two-period lived risk-neutral borrowers. Borrowers differ in their probabilities of re-
1Notable exceptions to this are Allard, Cresta, and Rochet (1997) and Newhouse (1996), who show that
fixed costs can support pooling equilibria in insurance markets with a finite number of risk types.
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ceiving a high endowment realization in the second period. To offer a lending contract,
which specifies an interest rate, a borrowing limit and a set of eligible borrowers, an
intermediary incurs a fixed cost. When designing loan contracts, lenders face an asym-
metric information problem, as they observe a noisy signal of a borrower’s true default
risk, while borrowers know their type. There is free entry into the credit market, and the
number and terms of lending contracts are determined endogenously. To address well
known issues related to existence of competitive equilibriumwith adverse selection, the
timing of the lending game builds on Hellwig (1987). This leads prospective lenders to
internalize how their entry decisions impact other lenders’ entry and exit decisions.
The equilibrium features a finite set of loan contracts, each “targeting” a specific pool
of risk types. The finiteness of contracts follows from the assumption that a fixed cost
is incurred per contract, so that some “pooling” is necessary to spread the fixed cost
across multiple types of borrowers. Working against larger pools is that these require a
broader range of risk types, leading to wider gaps between the average default rate and
the default risk of the least risky pool members. With free entry of intermediaries, these
forces lead to a finite set of contracts for any (strictly positive) fixed cost.
We use this framework to analyze the qualitative implications of three channels through
which financial innovations may have impacted credit card lending since the mid-1980s:
(i) reductions in the fixed cost of creating contracts; (ii) increased accuracy of lenders’
predictions of borrowers’ default risk; and (iii) a reduced cost of lenders’ funds. As we
discuss in Section 2, the first two channels capture the idea that improvements in infor-
mation technology reduced the cost of designing loan contracts, and allowed lenders to
price borrowers’ risk more accurately. The third channel is motivated by the increased
use of securitization (which reduced lenders’ costs of funds) and by lower costs of ser-
vicing consumer loans following improvements in information technology.
All three channels significantly impact the extensive margin of who has access to
risky loans. The measure of households offered risky loans depends on both the num-
ber of risky contracts and the size of each pool. Intuitively, financial innovation makes
the lending technology more productive, which leads to it being used more intensively
to sort borrowers into smaller pools. Holding the number of contracts fixed, this re-
duces the number of households with risky borrowing. However, improved lending
technology makes the marginal contract more attractive to borrowers by lowering the
break-even interest rate. Thus, sufficiently large financial innovations lead to the entry
of new contracts, targeted at riskier types than those served by existing contracts. In
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the model, the new contract margin dominates the local effect of smaller pools, so new
contracts increase the number of borrowers.
Aggregate borrowing and defaults are driven by the extensive margin, with more
borrowers leading to more borrowing and defaults. Changes in the size and number
of contracts induced by financial innovations result in more disperse interest rates, as
rates for low risk borrowers decline while high risk borrowers gain access to high rate
loans. Smaller pools lower the average gap between a household’s default risk and in-
terest rate, leading to improved risk-based pricing. This effect is especially pronounced
when the accuracy of the lending technology improves, as fewer high risk borrowers
are misclassified as low risk.
While all three channels are driven by a common information-intensive innovation
in lending technology, a natural question is whether they differ in predictions. One
dimension along which improved risk assessment differs from the other channels is the
average default rate of borrowers. On the one hand, whenever the number of contracts
increases, households with riskier observable characteristics gain access to risky loans.
However, an increase in signal accuracy also reduces the number of misclassified high
risk types offered loans targeted at low risk borrowers, which lowers defaults. In our
numerical example, these effects roughly offset, so that improved risk assessment leaves
the average default rate of borrowers essentially unchanged. Another dimension along
which the three channels differ is in their impact on overhead costs. While a decline in
the fixed costs leads to a decline in the overhead costs of borrowing, this is not so for
the other channels. An increase in signal accuracy and a fall in the cost of funds leads
to an increase of overhead costs (even as a percentage of total loans), as more types of
contracts are offered, each with its own fixed cost.
To evaluate the empirical relevance of our model, we examine changes in the dis-
tribution of credit card debt and interest rates, primarily using data from the Survey
of Consumer Finances from 1983 to 2004. We find the model predictions line up sur-
prisingly well with trends in the credit card market. Using credit card interest rates as
a proxy for product variety, we find that the number of different contracts tripled be-
tween 1983 and 2001. Even more strikingly, the empirical density of credit card interest
rates has become much “flatter”. While nearly 55% of households in 1983 reported the
same rate (18%), by the late 1990s no rate was shared by more than 10% of households.
This has been accompanied by more accurate pricing of risk, as the relationship between
observable risk factors and interest rates has tightened since the early 1980s.
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Consistent with themodel’s predictions, the jump in the fraction of households with a
bank credit card from 43% in 1983, to 56% in 1989 and 68% in 1998, entailed the extension
of cards to borrowers with riskier characteristics. Since the SCF is a repeated cross-
section, we build on Johnson (2007) and use a probit regression of bank card ownership
on household characteristics in 1989 to identify “new” and ”existing” cardholders in
1998. The “new” cardholders have riskier characteristics, being less likely to be married,
less educated, and have lower income and net worth – and higher interest rates and
delinquency rates. Building on this exercise, we conclude that the new cardholders
account for roughly a quarter of the increase in credit card debt from 1989 to 1998. We
conduct a similar exercise to quantify the contribution of the new cardholders to the rise
in delinquencies (a proxy for increased bankruptcy risk). We find that between a quarter
and a third of the rise can be attributed to the extensive margin of new cardholders.
Our empirical results on the quantitative importance of the extensive margin of new
cardholders for the rise in credit card debt and bankruptcy may surprise some. A
widespread view among economists is that the rise in bankruptcy was due primarily
to either an intensive margin of low risk borrowers taking on more debt (e.g. Nara-
jabad (2012), Sanchez (2012)) or a fall in the stigma of bankruptcy (Gross and Souleles
2002). Interestingly, our empirical exercise yields results for existing cardholders similar
to those of Gross and Souleles (2002) who found that the default probability, controlling
for risk measures, of a sample of credit card borrowers jumped between June 1995 and
June 1997. Thus, our empirical findings suggest that the rise in bankruptcy over the
1990s can be accounted for largely by the extensive margin and lower “stigma”.
The model provides novel insights into competition in the credit card market. In an
influential paper, Ausubel (1991) argued that the fact that declines in the risk-free rate
during the 1980s did not lower average credit card rates was “... paradoxical within the
paradigm of perfect competition.” However, this episode is consistent with our com-
petitive framework. A decline in the risk-free rate makes borrowing more attractive,
encouraging entry of new loan contracts that target riskier borrowers. This pushes up
the average risk premium, increasing the average borrowing rate. Thus, unlike in the
standard competitive lending model, the effect of a lower risk-free rate on the average
borrowing rate is ambiguous. Our extensive margin channel is related also to recent
work by Dick and Lehnert (2010). They find that increased competition, due to inter-
state bank deregulation (possibly aided by the adoption of information technology),
contributed to the rise in bankruptcies. Our model provides a theoretical mechanism
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for their empirical findings. By lowering barriers to interstate banking, deregulation ex-
pands market size, effectively lowering the fixed cost of contracts. In our framework,
this leads to the extension of credit to riskier borrowers, resulting in more bankruptcies.
Our framework also offers new insights into the debate over the welfare implications
of financial innovations. In our environment, financial innovations increase average (ex
ante) welfare but are not Pareto improving, as changes in the size of contracts result in
some households being shifted to higher interest rate contracts. Moreover, the compet-
itive allocation in general is not efficient, as it features more contracts and less cross-
subsidization than would be chosen by a social planner who weights all households
equally. This results in the financial sector consuming more resources than is optimal.
This paper is related to the incomplete market framework of consumer bankruptcy
of Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007).2 Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2010) and Athreya (2004) quantitatively evaluate alternative explanations
for the rise in bankruptcies and borrowing. Both papers conclude that changes in con-
sumer lending technology, rather than increased idiosyncratic risk (e.g., increased earn-
ings volatility), are the main factors driving the rise in bankruptcies.3 Unlike this paper,
they abstract from how financial innovations change the pricing of borrowers’ default
risk, andmodel financial innovation as a fall in the “stigma” of bankruptcy and a decline
in lenders’ cost of funds. Hintermaier and Koeniger (2009) find changes in the risk-free
rate have little impact on unsecured borrowing and bankruptcies.
Closely related in spirit is complementary work by Narajabad (2012), Sanchez (2012),
Athreya, Tam, and Young (2012), andDrozd andNosal (2008). Narajabad (2012), Sanchez
(2012) and Athreya, Tam, and Young (2012) examine improvements in lenders’ ability to
predict default risk. In these papers, more accurate or cheaper signals lead to relatively
lower risk households borrowing more (i.e., an intensive margin shift), which increases
their probability of defaulting. Drozd and Nosal (2008) examine a fall in the fixed cost
incurred by the lender to solicit potential borrowers, which leads to lower interest rates
and increased competition for borrowers. Our work differs from these papers in sev-
eral key respects. First, we introduce a novel mechanism which operates through the
extensive rather than intensive margin. Second, our tractable framework allows us to
derive closed form solutions and thereby provides insights into the mechanism, while
2 Chatterjee et al. (2008, 2010) formalize how credit histories support repayment of unsecured credit.
3Moss and Johnson (1999) argue, based on an analysis of borrowing trends, that the main cause of the
rise in bankruptcies is an increase in the share of unsecured credit held by lower income households.
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the previous literature has focused on complex quantitative models. Third, we docu-
ment several novel facts on the evolution of the credit card industry.
Also related to this paper is recent work on competitive markets with adverse selec-
tion. Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009), Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2012) and Einav, Jenk-
ins, and Levin (2009) find that subprime auto lenders face moral hazard and adverse
selection problems when designing the pricing and contract structure of auto loans, and
that there are significant returns to improved technology to evaluate loan applicants
(credit scoring). Earlier work by Ausubel (1999) also found that adverse selection is
present in the credit card market. Recent work by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), Guer-
rieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) and Bisin and Gottardi (2006) considers existence and
efficiency of competitive equilibria with adverse selection. Our paper differs both in its
focus on financial innovations, and its incorporation of fixed costs of creating contracts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents innovations
in the credit card industry since the 1980s, and Section 3 outlines the general model. In
Section 4 we characterize the set of equilibrium contracts, while Section 5 examines the
implications of financial innovations. Section 6 compares these predictions to data on
U.S. credit card borrowing, and Section 7 analyzes the quantitative role of the extensive
margin. Section 8 concludes. Additional details on the theory and empirical analysis is
provided in a supplementary web appendix.
2 Credit Card Industry: Evolution and Driving Forces
We begin by summarizing key aspects of the credit card industry today and its recent
evolution. This examination of current industry practice plays a key role in shaping
our modeling decisions (described in Section 3), particularly in motivating the fixed
costs of designing new credit card contracts. Subsection 2.2 outlines some of the key
innovators who reshaped the credit industry over the 1980s and 1990s (summarized
in Table reftimeline), while Subsection 2.3 documents the improvements in computing
and information technology that made possible an information intensive approach to
borrower risk assessment and contract design. The timing of these innovations leads us
to focus on comparing the model predictions with data from the late 1980s and 1990s.
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2.1 Credit Cards and Credit Scorecards
Credit card lenders today offer highly differentiated cards that vary in pricing (i.e., the
interest rate, annual fees and late fees) and other dimensions (e.g., affinity cards). This
entails a data-intensive strategy that designs contracts tailored to specific market seg-
ments (e.g., see Punch (1998)). In practice, this typically involves a numerically intensive
evaluation of the relationship between borrowers’ characteristics and credit risk (using
proprietary data and data purchased from credit bureaus). Credit card companies also
often undertake lengthy and costly experiments with alternative contract terms.4
Central to this data intensive approach to risk assessment is the use of specially devel-
oped credit scorecards.5 Each scorecard is a statistical model (estimated with historical
data) mapping consumer characteristics into repayment and default probability for a
specific product. Indeed, some large banks use 70 to 80 different scoring models in their
credit card operations, with each scorecard adapted to a specific product or market seg-
ment (McCorkell 2002). This involves substantial costs; developing, implementing and
managing a (single) customized scorecard can cost from $40,000 to more than $100,000
(see Mays (2004), p. 34).6 Custom scorecards are built in-house or developed by spe-
cialized external consultants (e.g., Moody’s Analytics and Risk Management Services and
Capital Card Services Inc.).7 While developing scorecards entails significant fixed costs,
the resulting automated system reduces the cost of evaluating individual applicants.8
These scorecards are distinct from (and typically supplement) general-purpose credit
scores, such as FICO.9 While many lenders use FICO scores as an input to their credit
evaluations, it is typically only one piece of information used to evaluate an individual’s
credit risk, and is combined with a custom score based on borrower characteristics (with
the score often conditioned on the specific product terms). This reflects the limitation of
4Experiments involve offering contract terms to random samples from a target population and tracking
borrowing and repayment behaviour (often over 18 to 24 months). Based on these data, lenders adjust
the terms and acceptance criteria (see Ausubel (1999) and Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, and Liu (2010)).
5One indication of the wide use of scorecards are the numerous handbooks providing practitioners de-
tailed guides on their development (e.g., Lawrence and Solomon (2002), Mays (2004), and Siddiqi (2006)).
6Customized scorecards are updated every few years to account for changes in the applicant popula-
tion and macroeconomic conditions. As a result, scorecard development requires recurring fixed costs.
7Siddiqi (2006) discusses a company that outsourced scorecard development and purchased ten differ-
ent cards at an average cost of $27,000 each.
8Citing the Federal Reserve Board (2007): “Credit-scoring systems generally involve significant fixed
costs to develop, but their ‘operating’ cost is extremely low – that is, it costs a lender little more to apply
the system to a few million cases than it does to a few hundred.”
9While FICO scores (introduced by Fair Isaac and Company) are the best known example, Mays (2004)
lists over 70 different generic credit scores.
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general-purpose scores, which are designed to predict default probabilities rather than
expected recovery rates or expected profitability of different borrowers for a specific
contract. As a result, a customized score can improve the accuracy of credit risk assess-
ment for borrowers offered a specific product. The estimation of scorecards often uses
both lender specific information (e.g., from experiments or client histories) and informa-
tion purchased from credit bureaus, such as generic credit scores, borrowers’ repayment
behaviour, and borrowers’ debt portfolio.10
2.2 Evolution of the Credit Card Industry
While the idea of systematically using historical data on loan performance to shape loan
underwriting standards dates back to Durand (1941), until recently consumer loan offi-
cers still relied primarily upon “the 4Cs” (i.e., Character, Capacity, Capital, Collateral)
(Smith 1964). This began to change in the late 1960s, as the emergence of credit cards and
advances in computing brought the development of application credit scoring models.
Pioneered by Fair Isaac, these models provided lenders with generic estimates of the
likelihood of serious delinquency in the upcoming year (Thomas 2009).
By the 1980s, advancements in information technology paved the way for a revo-
lution in how consumer loans are assessed, monitored and administered (Barron and
Staten 2003; Berger 2003; Evans and Schmalensee 2005). With lower costs of compu-
tation and data storage, behavioural credit scoring systems that incorporated payment
and purchase information and information from credit bureaus, were developed, trig-
gering the widespread adoption of credit scoring (McCorkell 2002; Engen 2000; Asher
1994; Thomas 2009).11 These innovations are asserted to have played a key role in the
growth of the credit card industry (Evans and Schmalensee 2005; Johnson 1992).12
The 1980s saw new entrants such as MBNA, First Deposit and Capital One build
on these advances to design credit card contracts for targeted segments of the popula-
tion. Shortly after its founding in 1981 as the first monoline credit card issuer (i.e., lender
10U.S. credit bureaus report borrowers’ payment history, debt and public judgments (Hunt 2006). More
than two million credit reports are sold daily by U.S. credit bureaus (Riestra 2002)
11Fair Isaac and Company started building credit scoring systems in the late 1950s. Their first behaviour
scoring system was introduced in 1975, first credit bureau score in 1981 and first general-purpose FICO
score in 1989. See http://www.fico.com/en/Company/Pages/history.aspx.
12Credit scoring improved lenders’ ability to assess risk and lowered operating costs. Both are signifi-
cant for credit cards which provide risky unsecured loans and face operating costs of nearly 60% of total
operations costs, compared to less than 20% of mortgage lending (Canner and Luckett 1992).
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specializing in credit cards), MNBA embarked on a strategy of data-based screening of
targets and underwriting standards for different credit card products (Cate and Staten
2003). In 1984, First Deposit Corporation13 adopted a business model of developing an-
alytic methods of targeting card offers to mispriced demographic groups (i.e., groups
with relatively low default probabilities for that product).14 Structured experimenta-
tion was pioneered by Rich Fairbank and Nigel Morris in 1988. Initially working with
a regional bank (Signet), they used experiments which involved sending out offers for
various products (i.e., credit cards with different terms) to consumers to design differ-
entiated credit products for individual market segments (Clemons and Thatcher 1998).
This “test and learn” strategy was so successful that in 1994, Signet spun off their group
as a monoline lender, Capital One, which became one of the largest U.S. credit card is-
suers. Capital One initiated the dynamic re-pricing customer accounts, a practive that
required intensive ongoing analysis of customer data (Clemons and Thatcher 2008).
This strategy of using quantitative methods and borrower data to design credit prod-
ucts targeted at different groups of borrowers was adopted by other large banks and
new monoline lenders throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.15 By the end of 1996,
42 large monoline lenders accounted for 77% of the total outstanding credit card bal-
ances of commercial banks (Federal Reserve Board 1997). The shifting landscape led to
changes in the pricing strategy of credit card lenders, with companies such as AmEx in-
troducing cards with different interest rates based on customers’ risk.16 This resulted in
declines (increases) in interest rates for lower (higher) risk borrowers (Barron and Staten
2003).17 The 1990s also saw non-bank lenders such as Sears (Discover), GM, AT&T and
GE enter the credit cardmarket to take advantage of proprietary data on their customers.
While the changes in the credit card market are widely discussed, there is surpris-
13Ultimately, it became Providian Financial Corporation, a leading issuer of credit cards.
14Initially developed by Andrew Kahr, their first credit card product targeted low-risk“revolvers” by
dropping the annual fee, upped the interest rate to 22%, lowering the minimum monthly payment, and
offering new customers a cash-advance loan (at a high interest rate). Four years after opening, First
Deposit had over 350,000 customers and $1 billion in credit card receivables (Nocera (1994), pp 315-324).
15A proxy for this diffusion is the fraction of large banks using credit scoring in loan approval, which
rose from 50% in 1988 to 85% in 2000 (American Bankers Association 2000). Similarly, the fraction of large
banks using fully automated loan processing (for direct loans) increased from 12% in 1988 to nearly 29%
in 2000 (American Bankers Association 2000). While larger banks often customize their own scorecards,
smaller banks adopted this technology by purchasing scores from specialized providers (Berger 2003).
16In 1992, AmEx’s Optima card charged prime rate plus 8.25% from its new customers, prime plus 6.5%
from its best customers, and prime plus 12.25% from chronic late-payers (Canner and Luckett 1992).
17A similar finding holds for small business loans, where the adoption of credit scoring led to the
extension of credit to “marginal applicants” at higher interest rates (Berger, Frame, and Miller 2005). For
another example of the adoption of small business scoring models see Paravisini and Schoar (2013).
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Table 1: Credit Card Evolution Timeline
Year Innovation Innovator Strategy
1981 Monoline MBNA Specializes in offering credit cards nationally.
1984 Segmentation First Deposit Corporation Target liquidity-constrained borrowers with
(later Providian) no-annual-fee cards with low minimum
payments, but high rates
Late Use of proprietary Non-bank entrants Use proprietary information on customers to
1980s information (Sears, GM, and AT&T) design products and target mispriced segments
1988 Experimentation Signet (later Capital One) Design randomized experiments with
R. Fairbank & N. Morris credit card terms to identify profitable segments
1992 Risk-based AmEx (Optima card) Interest rates respond to borrower’s
re-pricing payment behaviour
Sources: See text, Section 2.2.
ingly little quantitative documentation of the diffusion of new practices.18 To document
the timing of the diffusion of new lending technologies, we collected data on references
to credit scoring in various publications. Figure 2(a) plots normalized counts of the
words “credit scoring” and “credit score” in trade journals, the business press and aca-
demic publications.19 The figure shows a dramatic rise in references to credit scoring
in the professional press after 1987. Using GoogleScholar to count mentions in Business,
Finance, and Economics publications, we find a similar trend (see Figure 2(b)). Together,
these measures paint a clear picture: credit scoring was negligible in the 1970s, picked
up in the 1980s and accelerated in the mid 1990s.
2.3 Underlying Factors
Thus far, we have documented key innovations in the credit card industry — the de-
velopment of customized scorecards and greater use of detailed borrower data to price
borrower risk. Why did these innovations take hold in the 1980s and ’90s? Modern
credit scoring is a data-intensive exercise that requires large data sets (of payment his-
18This is a common challenge: “A striking feature of this literature [...] is the relative dearth of empirical
studies that [...] provide a quantitative analysis of financial innovation.” Frame and White (2004).
19More specifically, the figure displays the word count relative to the counts of the phrase “consumer
credit.” This normalization is necessary as the total number of printed words increased over time. See
Appendix B for details.
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tories and borrower characteristics) and rapid computing to analyze them (Giannasca
and Giordani 2013). Thus, technological improvements in IT that shrunk the costs of
data storage and processing were an essential prerequisite for the development and
widespread adoption of credit scoring (McCorkell 2002; Engen 2000; Asher 1994).
The dramatic decline in IT costs in the second half of the 20th century is illustrated by
the IT price index constructed by Jorgenson (2001) (Figure 2(c)), and by data on the cost
of computing from Nordhaus (2007) (Figure 2(d)). Coughlin, Waid, and Porter (2004)
report that the cost per MB of storage fell by a factor of roughly 100 between 1965 and
the early 1980s, before falling even faster over the next twenty years. Lower IT and data
storage costs led to the digitization of consumer records in the 1970s, in turn reducing
the cost of developing and using credit scoring tools to assess risk (Poon 2011).
Another key development in the credit industry related to how credit card compa-
nies finance their operations. Beginning in 1987, lenders began to securitize credit card
receivables. Securitization increased rapidly, with over a quarter of bank credit card bal-
ances securitized by 1991, and nearly half by 2005 (Federal Reserve Board 2006). This
facilitated the rapid growth of monolines, and helped lower financing costs for some
credit card lenders (Furletti 2002; Getter 2008).
3 Model Environment
We analyze a two-period small open economy populated by a continuum of borrowers,
who face a stochastic endowment in period 2. Markets are incomplete as only non-
contingent contracts can be issued. However, borrowers can default on contracts by
paying a bankruptcy cost. Financial intermediaries can access funds at an (exogenous)
risk-free interest rate r.
To capture key features of the credit card market as described in Section 2, our envi-
ronment incorporates two additional features. First, we assume that financial interme-
diaries incur a fixed cost to design each financial contract (characterized by a lending
rate, a borrowing limit and eligibility requirement for borrowers). Second, we assume
lenders observe a (potentially) noisy signal of borrowers’ risk types. In Section 5 we
vary the magnitude of these two frictions to capture the impact of improved informa-
tion technology on the credit card industry.
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3.1 People
Borrowers live for two periods and are risk-neutral, with preferences represented by:20
c1 + βEc2.
Each household receives the same deterministic endowment of y1 units of the consump-
tion good in period 1. The second period endowment, y2, is stochastic taking one of two
possible values: y2 ∈ {yh, yl}, where yh > yl.
21 Households differ in their probability ρ
of receiving the high endowment yh. We identify households with their type ρ, which is
distributed uniformly on [0, 1].22 While borrowers know their own type, lenders do not
observe it. However, upon paying a fixed cost (discussed below), the lenders get a signal
σ regarding a borrower’s type. With probability α, this signal is accurate: σ = ρ. With
probability (1− α), the signal is an independent draw from the ρ distribution (U [0, 1]).
We assume β < q¯ = 1
1+r
, so that households want to borrow at the risk-free rate.
Households’ borrowing, however, is limited by their inability to commit to repayment.
3.2 Bankruptcy
There is limited commitment by borrowers who can choose to declare bankruptcy in
period 2. The cost of bankruptcy to a borrower is the loss of fraction γ of the second-
period endowment. Lenders do not recover any funds from defaulting borrowers.
20Linearity of the utility function allows a clean characterization of the unique equilibrium. Using
CRRA preferences would complicate the analysis, as different types within a contract interval could dis-
agree about the optimal size of the loan (given the price). While introducing risk aversion would lose the
analytical tractability, we believe the main mechanism is robust as fixed costs create an incentive to pool
different types into contracts even with strictly concave utility functions.
21While the assumption of two possible income realizations affords us a great deal of tractability (in
part by making it easy to rank individual risk types), the key mechanism we highlight carries over to
richer environments. That is, as the costs of advancing loans fall, contracts become more “specialized,”
and lenders offer risky loans to new (and riskier) borrowers.
22The characterization of equilibria is practically unchanged for an arbitrary support [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1]. As-
suming the uniform distribution deliver very clean and elegant characterization of equilibrium allocation
but is not essential for any of the key results.
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3.3 Financial Market
Financial markets are competitive. Financial intermediaries can borrow at the exoge-
nously given interest rate r and make loans to borrowers. Loans take the form of one
period non-contingent bond contracts. However, the bankruptcy option introduces a
partial contingency by allowing bankrupts to discharge their debts.
Financial intermediaries incur a fixed cost χ to offer each non-contingent lending
contract to (an unlimited number of) households. Endowment-contingent contracts are
ruled out (e.g., due to non-verifiability of the endowment realization). A contract is
characterized by (L, q, σ), where L is the face value of the loan, q is the per-unit price of
the loan (so that qL is the amount advanced in period 1 in exchange for a promise to pay
L in period 2), and σ is a cut-off for which household types qualify for the contract.
The fixed cost of offering a contract is the costs of developing a scorecard (discussed
in Section 2.1), which allows the lender to assess borrowers’ risk types. Thus, upon
paying the fixed cost χ, a lender gets to observe a signal σ of a borrower’s type, which
is accurate (equal to ρ) with probability α. While each scorecard is specific to a contract
(that is, it informs a lender whether a borrower’s σ meets a specific threshold σ), the
signal σ is perfectly correlated across lenders (and is known to the borrower).23
In equilibrium, the bond price incorporates the fixed cost of offering the contract
(so that the equilibrium operating profit of each contract equals the fixed cost) and the
default probability of borrowers. Since no risk evaluation is needed for the risk-free
contract (γyl, q, 0), no fixed cost is required.
24 Households can accept only one loan, so
intermediaries know the total amount borrowed.
3.4 Timing
The timing of events is critical for supporting pooling across unobservable types in equi-
librium (see Hellwig (1987)). The key idea is that “cream-skimming” deviations are
made unprofitable if pooling contracts can exit the market in response.
23Consider, for example, a low-risk borrower who lives in a zip code with mostly high-risk consumers.
If the zip code is an input used for scorecards, all lenders will misclassify this borrower into a high risk
category (and the borrower is aware of that). This mechanism also applies to high-risk borrowers with
low-risk characteristics (e.g., long tenure with their current employer or at their current address).
24In an earlier version of the paper, we treated the risk-free contract symmetrically. This does not change
the key model predictions, but complicates the exposition and computational algorithms.
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1.a. Intermediaries pay fixed costs χ of entry and announce their contracts — the stage
ends when no intermediary wants to enter given the contracts already announced.
1.b Households observe all contracts and choose which one(s) to apply for (realizing
that some intermediaries may choose to exit the market).
1.c Intermediaries decide (using the scorecard) whether to advance loans to applicants
or exit the market.
1.d Lenders who chose to stay in the market notify qualified applicants.
1.e Borrowers who received loan offers pick their preferred loan contract. Loans are
advanced.
2.a Households realize their endowments and make default decisions.
2.b Non-defaulting households repay their loans.
3.5 Equilibrium
We study (pure strategy) Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the extensive form game de-
scribed in Subsection 3.4. In the complete information case, the object of interest become
Subgame Perfect Equilibria, and we are able to characterize the complete set of equilib-
rium outcomes. In the asymmetric information case, we characterize “pooling” equilib-
ria where all risky contracts have the same face value (i.e. equilibria that are similar to
the full information equilibria) and then numerically verify existence and uniqueness.
Details are given in Section 4.2.
In all cases, we emphasize equilibrium outcomes (the set of contracts offered and
accepted in equilibrium) rather than the full set of equilibrium strategies. While the
timing of the game facilitates existence of pooling equilibria, it also makes a complete
description of equilibrium strategies quite involved. The key idea is that the timing al-
lows us to support pooling in equilibrium by preventing “cream skimming” — offering
a slightly distorted contract which only “good” types would find appealing, leaving
the “bad” types with the incumbent contract. Allowing the incumbent to exit if such
cream-skimming is attempted (at stage 1.c) thus preempts cream skimming, so long as
the incumbent earns zero profit on the contract. For tractability, we simply describe the
set of contracts offered in equilibrium.
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An equilibrium (outcome) is a set of active contracts K∗ = {(qk, Lk, σk)k=1,...,N} and
consumers’ decision rules κ(ρ, σ,K) ∈ K for each type (ρ, σ) such that
1. Given {(qk, Lk, σk)k 6=j} and consumers’ decision rules, each (potential) bank j max-
imizes profits by making the following choice: to enter or not, and if it enters, it
chooses contract (qj , Lj, σj) and incurs fixed cost χ.
2. Given any K, a consumer of type ρ with public signal σ chooses which contract to
accept so as to maximize expected utility. Note that a consumer with public signal
σ can choose a contract k only if σ > σk.
4 Equilibrium Characterization
We begin by examining the environment with complete information regarding house-
holds’ risk types (α = 1). With full information, characterizing the equilibrium is rela-
tively simple since the public signal always corresponds to the true type. This case is
interesting for several reasons. First, this environment corresponds to a static version
of recent papers (i.e. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) and Chatterjee et al. (2007))
which abstract from adverse selection. The key difference is that the fixed cost gener-
ates a form of “pooling”, so households face actuarially unfair prices. Second, we can
analyze technological progress in the form of lower fixed costs. Finally, abstracting from
adverse selection helps illustrate the workings of the model. In Section 4.2 we show that
including asymmetric information leads to remarkably similar equilibrium outcomes.
4.1 Perfectly Informative Signals
In the full information environment, the key friction is that each lending contract re-
quires a fixed cost χ to create. Since each borrower type is infinitesimal relative to this
fixed cost, lending contracts have to pool different types to recover the cost of creating
the contract. This leads to a finite set of contracts being offered in equilibrium.
Contracts can vary along two dimensions: the face value L, which the household
promises to repay in period 2, and the per-unit price q of the contract. Our first result is
that all possible lending contracts are characterized by one of two face values. The face
value of the risk-free contract equals the bankruptcy cost in the low income state, so that
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households are always willing to repay. The risky contracts’ face value is the maximum
such that borrowers repay in the high income state. Contracts with lower face value are
not offered in equilibrium since, if (risk-neutral) households are willing to borrow at a
given price, they want to borrow as much as possible at that price. Formally:
Lemma 4.1. There are at most two loan sizes offered in equilibrium: A risk-free contract with
L = γyl and risky contracts with L = γyh.
Risky contracts differ in their bond prices and eligibility criteria. Since the eligibility
decision is made after the fixed cost has been incurred, lenders are willing to accept any
household who yields non-negative operating profits. Hence, a lender offering a risky
loan at price q rejects all applicants with risk type below some cut-off ρ such that the
expected return from the marginal borrower is zero: qρL − qL = 0, where ρqL is the
expected present value of repayment and qL is the amount advanced to the borrower.
This cut-off rule is summarized in the next Lemma:
Lemma 4.2. Every lender offering a risky contract at price q rejects an applicant iff the expected
profit from that applicant is negative. The marginal type accepted into the contract is ρ = q
q
.
This implies that the riskiest household accepted by a risky contract makes no con-
tribution to the overhead cost χ. We order the risky contracts by the riskiness of the
clientele served by the contract, from the least to the most risky.
Lemma 4.3. Finitely many risky contracts are offered in equilibrium. Contract n serves borrow-
ers in the interval [σn, σn−1), where σ0 = 1, σn = 1− n
√
2χ
γyhq
, at bond price qn = qσn.
Proof. If a contract yields strictly positive profit (net of χ), then a new entrant will enter,
offering a better price that attracts the borrowers from the existing contract. Hence, each
contract n earns zero profits in equilibrium, so that:
χ =
∫ σn−1
σn
(ρq − qn)Ldρ = L
(
(σn−1)
2 − (σn)
2
2
q¯ − (σn−1 − σn)qn
)
.
Using qn = σnq and L = γyh from Lemmata 4.1 and 4.2, and solving for σn, we obtain
σn = σn−1 −
√
2χ
γyhq¯
. Using σ0 = 1 and iterating on σn, gives σn = 1− n
√
2χ
γyhq¯
.
Lemma 4.3 establishes that each contract serves an interval of borrower types of equal
length,25 and that the measure pooled in each contract increases in the fixed cost χ and
25This result follows from the assumption of uniform distribution of types. With a non-uniform distri-
bution, contracts would serve intervals of different lengths.
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the risk-free interest rate, and decreases in the bankruptcy punishment γyh. If the fixed
cost is so large that
√
2χ
γyhq¯
> 1, then no risky loans are offered.
The number of risky contracts offered in equilibrium is pinned down by the house-
holds’ participation constraints. Given a choice between several risky contracts, house-
holds always prefer the contract with the highest q. Thus, a household’s decision prob-
lem reduces to choosing between the best risky contract they are eligible for and the
risk-free contract. The value to type ρ of contract (q, L) is
vρ(q, L) = qL+ β [ρ(yh − L) + (1− ρ)(1− γ)yl] ,
and the value of the risk-free contract is
vρ(q¯, γyl) = q¯γyl + β [ρyh + (1− ρ)yl − γyl] .
A household of type ρ accepts risky contract (q, L) only if vρ(q, L) ≥ vρ(q¯, γyl), which
reduces to
q > (q¯ − β)
γyl
L
+ β
(
ρ+ (1− ρ)
γyl
L
)
(4.1)
Note that the right-hand side of equation (4.1) is increasing in ρ. Hence, if the participa-
tion constraint is satisfied for the highest type in the interval, σn−1, it will be satisfied for
any household with ρ < σn−1. Solving for the equilibrium number of contracts, N , thus
involves finding the first risky contract n for which this constraint binds for σn−1.
Lemma 4.4. The equilibrium number of contracts offered,N , is the largest integer smaller than:
(yh − yl)[q¯ − β(1 +
√
2χ
γyhq¯
)]
[q¯yh − β(yh − yl)]
√
2χ
γyhq¯
.
If the expression is negative, no risky contracts are offered.
Proof. We need to find the riskiest contract for which the household at the top of the
interval participates: i.e. the largest n such that risk type σn−1 prefers contract n to the
risk-free contract. Substituting for contract n in the participation constraint (4.1) of σn−1:
qn ≥ (q¯ − β)
yl
yh
+ β
[
σn−1 + (1− σn−1)
yl
yh
]
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Using qn = σnq¯ and σn = 1− n
√
2χ
γyhq
from Lemma 4.3, and solving for n, this implies
n ≤
(yh − yl)
[
q¯ − β
(
1 +
√
2χ
γyhq¯
)]
[q¯yh − β(yh − yl)]
√
2χ
γyhq¯
The set of equilibrium contracts is fully characterized by the following theorem, which
follows directly from Lemmata 4.1-4.4, and is illustrated in Figure 3(a).
Theorem 4.5. If (q¯ − β)[yh − yl] > q¯yh
√
2χ
γyhq¯
, then there exists N ≥ 1 risky contracts char-
acterized by: L = γyh, σn = 1 − n
√
2χ
γyhq
, and qn = qσn. N is the largest integer smaller than
(yh−yl)
[
q¯−β
(
1+
√
2χ
γyhq¯
)]
[q¯yh−β(yh−yl)]
√
2χ
γyhq¯
. One risk-free contract is offered at price q¯ to all households with ρ < σN .
4.2 Incomplete Information
We now characterize equilibria with asymmetric information. We focus on “pooling”
equilibria which closely resemble the compete information equilibria of Section 4.1.26
These “pooling” equilibria feature one risk-free contract with loan size L = γyl and
finitely many risky contracts with L = γyh, each targeted at a subset of households with
sufficiently high public signal σ. While we are unable to provide a complete characteri-
zation of equilibria with asymmetric information for arbitrary parameter values, we are
able to numerically verify that the “pooling” equilibrium is in fact the unique equilib-
rium for the parameter values we consider.
Themain complication introduced by asymmetric information arises frommislabeled
borrowers. The behaviour of borrowers with incorrectly high public signals (σ > ρ) is
easy to characterize, since they always accept the contract offered to their public type.
Customers with incorrectly low public signals, however, may prefer the risk-free con-
tract over the risky contract for their public type. While this is not an issue in the best
loan pool (as no customer is misclassified downwards), the composition of riskier pools
26In contrast, a “separating” equilibrium would include smaller risky “separating” loans targeted at
mislabeled borrowers who were misclassified into high-risk contracts. Note that our notion of “pooling”
is not quite standard, as it allows mislabeled types to decline the risky “pooling” loan they are offered,
and join the risk-free loan pool.
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(and thus the pricing) may be affected by the “opt-out” of misclassified low risk types.
For each risky contract, denote ρˆn the highest true type willing to accept that contract
over a risk-free loan. Using the participation constraints, we have:
ρˆn =
qnyh − qyl
β(yh − yl)
. (4.2)
Since ρˆn is increasing in qn, lower bond prices result in a higher opt-out rate. Households
who decline risky loans (i.e., those with public signal σ ∈ [σn, σn−1) and true type ρ > ρˆn)
borrow via the risk free contract. Figure 3(b) illustrates the set of equilibrium contracts.
Despite this added complication, the structure of equilibrium loan contracts remain
remarkably similar to the full information case. Strikingly, as the following lemma es-
tablishes, the intervals of public signals served by the risky contracts are of equal size.
Lemma 4.6. In a “pooling” equilibrium, the interval of public types served by each risky contract
is of size
√
2χ
αqγyh
.
Proof. This result follows from the free entry and uniform type distribution assump-
tions. Consider an arbitrary risky contract. For any public type σ, let Epi(σ) denote
expected profits. Note that the lowest public type accepted σ, yields zero expected prof-
its. Free entry implies the contract satisfies the zero profit condition, so total profits from
the interval of public types between σ and σ + θ must equal χ.
∫ θ
0
Epi(σ + δ)dδ = χ (4.3)
With probability α the signal is correct (so ρ = σ), while with probability 1−α the signal
is incorrect, in which case types ρ > ρˆ choose to opt out. To determine the profit from
type σ+δ, note that the fraction of households that do not opt out is α+(1−α)ρˆ. Hence:
Epi(σ + δ) = (α + (1− α)ρˆ)Epi(σ + δ|ρ < ρˆ)
= (α + (1− α)ρˆ) [qE(ρ|σ = σ + δ, ρ < ρˆ)γyh − qnγyh] .
The additional repayment probability from public type σ + δ over type σ is αδ
α+(1−α)ρˆ
,
which is simply the probability that the signal is correct times the difference in repay-
ment rates corrected for the measure that accepts the contract (α + (1− α)ρˆ). Thus:
Epi(σ + δ) = (α + (1− α)ρˆ)
[
αδq
α+ (1− α)ρˆ
γyh + q (E(ρ|σ = σ, ρ < ρˆ)) γyh − qnγyh
]
.
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At the bottom cutoff, σ < σ + θ ≤ ρˆ. Thus, the last two terms equal the expected profit
from public signal σ:
Epi(σ + δ) = (α + (1− α)ρˆ)
[
αδq
α+ (1− α)ρˆ
γyh + Epi(σ)
]
.
Since the expected profit for type σ is zero, this simplifies to Epi(σ + δ) = αδqγyh. Plug-
ging this into equation (4.3), we have
∫ θ
0
αqγyhδdδ = χ. It follows that θ =
√
2χ
αqγyh
.
The expression for the length of the interval (of public types) served closely resembles
the complete information case in Lemma 4.3. The only difference is that less precise
signals increase the interval length by the multiplicative factor
√
1/α. This is intuitive,
as the average profitability of a type decreases as the signal worsens, and thus larger
pools are needed to cover the fixed cost. What is surprising is that the measure of public
types targeted by each contract is the same, especially since the fraction who accept
varies due to misclassified borrowers opting out. As the proof of Lemma 4.6 illustrates,
this is driven by two effects that exactly offset each other: lower-ranked contracts have
fewer borrowers accepting, but make up for it through higher profit per borrower. As a
result, the profitability of a type (σ + δ) is the same across contracts (= αδqγyh).
As in the full information case, the number of risky contracts offered in equilibrium
is pinned down by the household participation constraints. Type ρ is willing to accept
risky contract (q, L)whenever vρ(q, L) ≥ vρ(q¯, γyl). This also implies that if the n-th risky
contract (qn, γyh, σn) is offered, then ρˆn > σn−1. That is, no accurately labeled customer
ever opts out of a risky contract in equilibrium. Combining Lemma 4.6 with the zero
marginal profit condition, one can derive a relationship between the bond price and the
cutoff public type for each contract. The next theorem summarizes this result.
Theorem 4.7. Finitely many risky contracts are offered in a “pooling” equilibrium. The n-
th contract (qn, γyh, σn) serves borrowers with public signals in the interval [σn, σn−1), where
σ0 = 1, and σn = 1− n
√
2χ
αqγyh
. The bond price qn solves
q¯σnα = qn (α + (1− α)ρˆn)− q¯(1− α)
(ρˆn)
2
2
,
where ρˆn is given by equation (4.2). If the participation constraints of mislabeled borrowers do
not bind (ρˆn = 1), this simplifies to qn = q
(
ασn + (1− α)
1
2
)
.
To verify that this “pooling” allocation is an equilibrium, we need to rule out the
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possibility of profitable entry of new (separating) contracts. Specifically, one needs to
rule out “cream skimming” deviations targeted at borrowers whose public signals are
lower than their true type. Such deviation contracts necessarily involve smaller loans
offered at better terms, since public types that are misclassified downwards must prefer
them to the risk-free contract and true types must prefer the risky contract they are
eligible for. In the numerical examples, we computationally verify that such deviations
are not profitable. The fixed cost plays an essential role, as it forces potential entrant to
“skim” enough people to cover the fixed cost. See Appendix A for a detailed description
of the possible deviation and verification procedure.
By numerically ruling out these deviations we also establish that “pooling” is the
unique equilibrium. Given our timing assumptions, the existence of a “separating” equi-
libriumwould rule out the “pooling” equilibrium, since “separating” is preferred by the
best customers (highest ρ’s). Uniqueness within the class of “pooling” equilibria follows
from the same argument given for the complete information case in Section 4.1.
5 Implications of Financial Innovations
In this section, we analyze the model implications for three channels through which fi-
nancial innovations could impact consumer credit: (i) a decline in the fixed cost χ, (ii)
a decrease in the cost of loanable funds q¯, and (iii) an improvement in the accuracy of
the public signal α. Given the stylized nature of our model, we focus on the qualita-
tive predictions for borrowing, defaults, interest rates and the composition of borrow-
ers. We find that all three channels affect the extensive margin of who has access to
credit. “Large enough” innovations lead to more credit contracts, access to risky loans
for higher risk households, more disperse interest rates, more borrowing, and defaults.
Each of these channels have different implications for changes in the ratio of overhead
cost to total loans and the average default rate of borrowers.
5.1 Decline in the Fixed Cost
It is widely agreed that lower information processing costs have facilitated the increased
use of data intensive analysis to design credit scorecards for new credit products (Mc-
Nab and Taylor 2008). In our model, this corresponds to lower fixed costs, χ. We use the
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analytical results from Section 4.1, and an illustrative numerical example (see Figure 4),
to explore how the model predictions vary with χ.27 For simplicity, we focus on the full
information case (α = 1). Qualitatively similar results hold when α < 1.
A decline in the fixed cost of creating a contract, χ, impacts the set of equilibrium
contracts via both the measure served by each contract and the number of contracts (see
Figure 4.A and B). Since each contract is of length
√
2χ
γyhq
, holding the number of con-
tracts fixed, a reduction in χ reduces the total measure of borrowers. However, a large
enough decline in the fixed cost lowers the borrowing rates for (previously) marginal
borrowers enough that they prefer the risky to the risk-free contract. This increase in the
number of contracts introduces discontinuous jumps in the measure of risky borrow-
ers. Globally (for sufficiently large changes in χ), the extensive margin of an increase in
the number of contracts dominates, so the measure of risky borrowers increases. This
follows from Theorem 4.5, as the measure of risky borrowers is bounded by:
1− σN = N
√
2χ
γyhq
∈

(yh − yl)(q¯ − β)− q¯yh
√
2χ
γyh q¯
q¯yh − β(yh − yl)
,
(yh − yl)[q¯ − β(1 +
√
2χ
γyhq¯
)]
q¯yh − β(yh − yl)

 .
Note that the global effect follows from the fact that both the left and the right bound-
aries of the interval are decreasing in χ.
Since all risky loans have the same face value L = γyh, variations in χ affect credit ag-
gregates primarily through the extensive margin of how many households are eligible.
As a result, borrowing and defaults inherit the “saw-tooth” pattern of risky borrowers
(see Figure 4.C, D and E). However, the fact that new contracts extend credit to riskier
borrowers leads (globally) to defaults increasing faster than borrowing. The reason is
that the amount borrowed, qnL, for a new contract is lower than for existing contracts
since the bond price is lower. Hence, the amount borrowed rises less quickly than does
the measure of borrowers (compare Figure 4.C with 4.D). Conversely, the extension of
credit to riskier borrowers causes total defaults (
∫ 1
σN
(1−ρ)dρ = 1/2−σN+
σ2
N
2
) to increase
faster, leading to higher default rates (see Figure 4.E).
The rise in defaults induced by lower χ is accompanied by a tighter relationship be-
tween individual risk and borrowing interest rates. The shrinking of each contract inter-
val lowers the gap between the average default rate in each pool and each borrower’s
default risk, leading to more accurate risk-based pricing. As the number of contracts
27The example parameters are β = 0.75, γ = 0.25, yl = 0.6, yh = 3, r¯ = 0.04, with χ ∈ [0.0005, 0.00001].
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increases, interest rates become more disperse and the average borrowing interest rate
slightly increases. This reflects the extension of credit to riskier borrowers at high inter-
est rates, while interest rates on existing contracts fall (see Figure 4.F).
There are two key points to take from Figure 4.G, which plots total overhead costs as
a percentage of borrowing. First, overhead costs in the example are very small. Second,
even though χ falls by a factor of 50, total overhead costs (as % of debt) fall only by a
factor of 7. The smaller decline in overheads costs is due to the decrease in the measure
served by each contract, so that each borrower has to pay a larger share of the overhead
costs. This suggests that cost of operations of banks (or credit card issuers) may not be a
good measure of technological progress in the banking sector.
The example also highlights a novel mechanism via which interstate bank deregula-
tion could impact consumer credit markets. In our model, an increase in market size is
analogous to a lower χ, since what matters is the ratio of the fixed cost to the measure
of borrowers. Thus, the removal of geographic barriers to banking across geographic
regions, which effectively increases the market size, acts similarly to a reduction in χ
and results in the extension of credit to riskier borrowers. This insight is particularly
interesting given recent work by Dick and Lehnert (2010), who find that interstate bank
deregulation (which they suggest increased competition) was a contributing factor to
the rise in consumer bankruptcies. Our example suggests that deregulation may have
led to more bankruptcies not by increasing competition per se, but by facilitating in-
creased market segmentation by lenders. This (for large enough changes) leads to the
extension of credit to riskier borrowers, and thus more bankruptcies.28
5.2 Decline in the Risk Free Rate
Another channel through which financial innovations may have affected consumer credit
is by lowering lenders’ cost of funds, either via securitization or lower costs of loan pro-
cessing. To explore this channel, we vary the risk free interest rate in our model. For
simplicity, we again assume that α = 1, although similar results hold for α < 1.
The effect of a decline in the risk free rate is similar to a decline in fixed costs. Once
again, the measure of borrowers depends upon how many contracts are offered and the
28Bank deregulation and improved information technology may explain the increased role of large
credit card providers who offer cards nationally, whereas early cards were offered by regional banks.
23
measure served by each contract. The length of each contract is
√
2χ
αyhγq
, so a lower risk-
free interest rate leads to fewer borrowers per contract. Intuitively, the pass-through
of lower lending costs to the bond price qn makes the fixed cost smaller relative to the
amount borrowed. Since the contract size depends on the trade-off between spreading
the fixed cost across more households versus more cross-subsidization across borrow-
ers, the effective reduction in the fixed cost induces smaller pools. Sufficiently large
declines in the risk-free rate increase the bond price (qn+1) of the marginal risky contract
by enough that borrowers prefer it to the risk-free contract. Since the global effect of ad-
ditional contracts dominates the local effect of smaller pools, sufficiently large declines
in the cost of funds lead to more households with risky loans (see Figure 5.A and B).
As with χ, credit aggregates are affected primarily through the extensive margin.
Since increasing the number of borrowers involves the extension of risky loans to riskier
borrowers, globally default rates rise with borrowing (see Figure 5.D and E). The av-
erage borrowing interest rate reflects the interaction between the pass-through of lower
cost of funds, the change in the composition of borrowers, and increased overhead costs.
For each existing contract, the lending rate declines by less than the risk-free rate since
with smaller pools the fixed cost is spread across fewer borrowers. Working in the op-
posite direction is the entry of new contracts with high interest rates, which increases
the maximum interest rate (see Figure 5.F). As a result, the average interest rate on risky
loans declines by less than 1 point in response to a 4 point decline in the risk-free rate.
This example offers interesting insights into the debate over competition in the U.S.
credit card market. In an influential paper, Ausubel (1991) documented that the decline
in risk-free interest rates in the 1980s did not result in lower average credit card rates.
This led some to claim that the credit card industry was imperfectly competitive. In
contrast, Evans and Schmalensee (2005) argued that measurement issues associatedwith
fixed costs of lending and the expansion of credit to riskier households during the late
1980s implied that Ausubel’s observation could be consistent with a competitive lending
market. Our model formalizes this idea.29 As Figure 5.F illustrates, a decline in the risk-
free interest rate can leave the average interest rate largely unchanged, as cheaper credit
pulls in riskier borrowers, which increases the risk-adjusted interest rate.
29Brito and Hartley (1995) formalize a closely related mechanism, but with an exogenously fixed num-
ber of contracts (risk categories), whereas in our model entry of new new contracts plays a key role.
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5.3 Improvements in Signal Accuracy
The last channel we consider is an improvement in lenders’ ability to assess borrowers’
default risk. This is motivated by the improvement of credit evaluation technologies
(see Section 2), which maps naturally into an increase in signal accuracy, α. We again
use our numerical example to help illustrate the model predictions (see Figure 6).30
Variations in signal accuracy (α) impact who is offered and who accepts risky loans.
As in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the measure offered a risky loan depends upon the number
and “size” of each contract. From Theorem 4.7, the measure eligible for each contract
(
√
2χ
αqγyh
) is decreasing in α (see Figure 6.B). Intuitively, higher α makes the credit tech-
nology more productive, which results in it being used more intensively to sort borrow-
ers into smaller pools. Higher α also pushes up bond prices (qn) by lowering the number
of misclassified high risk types eligible for each contract. This results in fewer misclassi-
fied low risk households declining risky loans, narrowing the gap between the measure
accepting versus offered risky loans (see Figure 6.C). A sufficiently large increase in α
raises the bond price of the marginal risky contract enough that it is preferred to the
risk-free contract, resulting in a new contract being offered (see Figure 6.A). Globally,
the extensive margin of the number of contracts dominates, so the fraction of the popu-
lation offered a risky contract increases with signal accuracy.
More borrowers leads to an increase in debt. Similar to a decline in the fixed cost
of contracts, an increase in the number of contracts involves the extension of credit to
higher risk (public) types, which increases defaults (Figure 6.E). However, the impact
of higher α on the default rate of borrowers is more nuanced, as the extension of credit
to riskier public types is partially offset by fewer misclassified high risk types. These
offsetting effects can be seen in the expression for total defaults (Equation 5.1).
Defaults = α
(
1− σN −
1− σ2N
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Correctly Classified
+ (1− α)
N∑
j=1
(
σj−1 − σj
)(
ρˆj −
(ρˆj)
2
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Misclassified
(5.1)
As α increases, the rise in the number of contracts (N) lowers σN , which leads to more
defaults by correctly classified borrowers. However, higher α also lowers the number of
misclassified borrowers, who are riskier on average than the correctly classified. In our
example, this results in the average default rate of borrowers varying little in response to
30We vary the fraction of people with a correct signal from 0.75 to 0.9999, with χ = 0.0001.
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α, so that total defaults increase proportionally to the total number of (risky) borrowers.
Figure 6.F shows that interest rates fan out as α rises, with the minimum rate declin-
ing, while the highest rises. This again reflects the offsetting effects of improved risk
assessment. By reducing the number of misclassified borrowers, default rates for ex-
isting contracts decline, which lowers the risk premium and thus the interest rate. The
maximum interest rate, in contrast, rises (globally) since increases in α lead to new con-
tracts targeted at riskier borrowers. Finally, since the average default rate for borrowers
is relatively invariant to α, so is the average risk premium (and thus the average inter-
est rate). Overall, higher α leads to a tighter relationship between (ex-post) individual
default risk and (ex-ante) borrowing interest rates.
Total overhead costs (as a percentage of risky borrowing) increase with α (Figure 6.G),
which reflects more intensive use of the lending technology induced by its increased ac-
curacy. As a consequence, equating technological progress with reduced cost of lending
can be misleading, since technological progress (in the form of an increase in α) may
increase overhead costs.
5.4 Financial Innovations and Welfare
The welfare effects of the rise in consumer borrowing and bankruptcies, and financial
innovations in general, have been the subject of much discussion (Tufano 2003; Athreya
2001). In our model, we find that financial innovations improve ex-ante welfare, as
the gains from increased access to credit outweigh higher deadweight default costs and
overhead lending costs. However, financial innovations are not Pareto improving, as
some borrowers are disadvantaged ex-post.
The natural welfare measure in our model is the ex-ante utility of a borrower before
their type (ρ, σ) is realized. As panel H of Figures 4, 5 and 6 show, all three financial
innovations increase welfare. The impact of “large” innovations (which induce entry
of additional contracts) is intuitive, as borrowers who switch from the risk-free to risky
contracts benefit (otherwise they would not switch). The ”local” welfare effects are less
straightforward, as financial innovations both reduce access to risky borrowing (which
lowers welfare) and lower risky borrowing rates (which increase welfare). Reduced ac-
cess, however, has a small welfare effect, since the marginal borrowers (who lose access)
are (relatively) risky types. As a result, their loss is largely offset by a lower average
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default premiumwhich reduces other borrowers’ interest rates. Overall, this means that
the direct effect of innovation on borrowing rates dominate.
While financial innovations increase ex-antewelfare, they are not Pareto improving as
they generate both winners and losers ex-post (i.e., once people know their type (ρ, σ)).
When the length of the contract intervals shrink, the worst borrowers in each contract
(those near the bottom cut-off σn) are pushed into a higher interest rate contract. Thus,
these borrowers always lose (locally) from financial innovation. While this effect holds
with andwithout asymmetric information, improved signal accuracy adds an additional
channel via which innovation creates losers. As α increases, some borrowers who were
previously misclassified with high public signal become correctly classified, and as a
result face higher interest rates (or, no access to risky loans). Conversely, borrowers who
were previously misclassified “down” benefit from better borrowing terms as do (on
average) correctly classified risk types.
Although financial innovations are welfare improving, the competitive equilibrium
allocation is not constrained efficient.31 Formally, we consider the problem of a social
planner who maximizes the ex-ante utility of borrowers before types (ρ, σ) are realized,
subject to the technological constraint that each (risky) lending contract offered incurs
fixed cost χ.32 The constrained efficient allocation features fewer contracts, each serving
more borrowers, than the competitive equilibrium. Rather than using the zero expected
profit condition to pin down the eligibility set (Proposition 4.2), the planner extends the
eligibility set of each contract to include borrowers who deliver negative expected prof-
its while making the best type (within the contract eligibility set) indifferent between the
risky contract and the risk-free contract (i.e. equation (4.1) binds). Since this allocation
“wastes” fewer resources on fixed costs, average consumption is higher.
This inefficiency is not directly related to adverse selection, as the perfect information
equilibrium is also inefficient.33 Instead, this inefficiency is analogous to the business
stealing effect of entry models with fixed costs where the competitive equilibrium suffers
from excess entry (Mankiw and Whinston 1986). Borrowers would like to commit to
31This contrasts with the constrained efficiency result in Allen and Gale (1989). The key difference be-
tween their model and ours arises from the option to pool multiple borrowers to cover the fixed cost of
issuing a loan (security). In our model, the inefficiency arises from the creation of too many (i.e. ineffi-
ciently small) pools, which does not occur in Allen and Gale (1989) as pooling is ruled out.
32See the web appendix for the explicit representation and solution characterization.
33Since borrowers are risk-neutral there are no direct welfare gains from increased ex post cross-
subsidization across borrowers. Thus, the inefficiency differs from the standard mechanism in competi-
tive equilibria with adverse selection due to inefficient risk-sharing, as in Prescott and Townsend (1984).
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larger pools with greater cross-subsidization ex-ante (before their type is realized); but
ex post some borrowers prefer the competitive contracts. This highlights the practical
challenge of improving upon the competitive allocation, as any such policy would make
some borrowers worse off and essentially requires a regulated monopolist lender.
6 Comparing the Model Predictions to the Data
In this section, we ask whether the empirical evidence is consistent with three keymodel
predictions of the effect of financial innovation: (i) an increase in the “variety” (number)
of credit contracts, (ii) increased access to borrowing for riskier borrowers, and (iii) an
increase in risk-based pricing.34 Motivated by the evidence in Section 2, we focus on
developments in the credit card market between the mid-1980s and 2000. Subsection
6.1 documents a surge in the number of credit card products during this period. In
subsection 6.2 we show that the rise in the fraction of households with access to credit
involved the extension of cards to riskier borrowers. Finally, subsection 6.3 outlines
evidence of an increase in risk-based pricing since the late 1980s. Our conclusion is that
these key model predictions are broadly consistent with the timing of the changes in the
credit card industry documented in Section 2.
6.1 Increased Variety in Consumer Credit Contracts
The three financial innovations we consider all predict an increase in the number of
risky contracts. In our model, a rise in product variety manifests as an increase in the
number of different interest rates offered and as a larger spread between the average and
maximum rates. We find a similar trend in the data: the number of different credit card
interest rates offered to consumers has increased, the distribution (across borrowers) has
become more dispersed and the gap between the average and maximum rate has risen.
We use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) on the interest rate paid
on credit cards to count the number of different interest rates reported. The second and
third columns of Table 2 show that the number of different interest rates reported nearly
34The underlying model-implied changes result from an increase in α, a decrease in χ or lower cost of
funds sufficiently large to increase the number of contracts offered.
28
tripled between 1983 and 2004.35 This has been accompanied by increased dispersion
across households as the coefficient of variation (CV) also nearly tripled.36
Table 2: Credit Card Interest Rates, SCF
Year # of Rates # of Rates CV CV
All Households (HH with B > 0) All HH (HH with B > 0)
1983 78 47 0.22 0.21
1995 142 118 0.30 0.32
1998 136 115 0.32 0.35
2001 222 155 0.37 0.40
2004 211 145 0.56 0.56
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Survey of Consumer Finances.
Comparing the empirical density of interest rates demonstrates this point even more
clearly. Figure 7 displays the fraction of households reporting different interest rates in
the SCF for 1983 and 2001. It is striking that in 1983 more than 50% of households faced
a rate of exactly 18%. The 2001 distribution (and other recent years) is notably “flatter”
than that of 1983, with no rate reported by more than 12% of households.
We also find increased dispersion in borrowing interest rates from survey data col-
lected from banks by the Board of Governors on credit card interest rates and 24-month
consumer loans.37 As can be seen from Figure 8(a), the CV for 24-month consumer
loans was relatively constant throughout the 1970s, then started rising sharply in the
mid-1980s. A similar increase also occurred in credit cards.38 The rise in dispersion has
been accompanied by an increased spread between the lowest and highest interest rates.
Moreover, despite a decline in the the average (nominal) interest rate, the maximum rate
charged by banks has actually increased (see Figure 8(b)).
35This likely understates the increase in variety, as Furletti (2003) and Furletti and Ody (2006) argue
credit card providers make increased use of features such as annual fees and purchase insurance to dif-
ferentiate their products, while Narajabad (2012) documents increased dispersion in credit limits.
36Since we are comparing trends in dispersion of a variable with a changing mean (due to lower risk-
free rates), we report the coefficient of variation (CV) instead of the variance of interest rates.
37We use data from the Quarterly Report of Interest Rates on Selected Direct Consumer Installment
Loans (LIRS) and the Terms of Credit Card Plans (TCCP). See Appendix B for more details. Since each
bank can report only one (the most common) interest rate this likely understates the increase in options.
38While credit card interest rates is the better measure for our purposes, this series begins in 1990.
However, since the two series move largely in parallel, we view the evidence from the 24-month consumer
loans as indicative.
29
6.2 Increased Access to Risky Loans for Riskier Borrowers
The extensive margin plays a central role in the model as improvements in the lending
technology generate an extension of (risky) loans to riskier borrowers. The increase in
the number of households with a bank credit card is clear: the fraction of households
with a bank credit card jumped from 43% in 1983 to 68% in 1998 (see Table 3). This
supports the common narrative of a “democratization of credit” in the 1980s and 1990s.
Table 3: Percent of Households with Bank Credit Card, by Income Quintile
Quintile 1983 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004
1 0.11 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.37 0.38
2 0.27 0.40 0.54 0.55 0.59 0.66 0.62
3 0.41 0.61 0.64 0.72 0.73 0.79 0.77
4 0.57 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.88
5 0.79 0.89 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96
All 0.43 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.68 0.73 0.71
N 4103 3143 3906 4299 4305 4442 4519
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, Bankcards only.
Were the new credit card holders of the 1980s and 1990s risker than the typical credit
card holder of the early 1980s? A direct - but rough - proxy for risk is household in-
come. Table 3 shows that the rise in card ownership was largest in the middle and lower
middle income quintiles, where bank card ownership rose by more than 30 percentage
points between 1983 and 1995. This increase in access for lower income households has
been accompanied by a significant increase in their share of total credit card debt out-
standing. Figure 8(c) plots the cdf for the share of total credit card balances held by
various percentiles of the earned income distribution in 1983 and 2004. The fraction of
debt held by the bottom 30% (50%) of earners nearly doubled from 6.1% (16.8%) in 1983
to 11.2% (26.6%) in 2004. Given that the value of total credit card debt also increased,
this implies that lower income households’ credit card debt increased significantly.39
An alternative approach is to directly examine changes in the risk characteristics of
bank credit card holders from 1989 to 1998 in the SCF.40 Since the SCF is a repeated
39The increased access of lower income households to credit card debt is well established, see e.g. Bird,
Hagstrom, and Wild (1999), Fellowes and Mabanta (2007), Lyons (2003), Black and Morgan (1999), Ken-
nickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000), and Durkin (2000).
40We choose 1989 and 1998 for three reasons. First, since 1989 the SCF asks whether households were at
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cross-section, not a panel, we require a procedure to identify “new” from ”existing”
cardholders. Herewe follow Johnson (2007), and assume that of the 69.5% of households
with a card in 1998, 57% (the fraction with a card in 1989, see Table 4) are “existing” and
the other 12.5% “new.”41 To identify who is new, we run a probit regression of bank card
ownership on households’ characteristics in 1989. Using the 1989 regression coefficients
together with the 1998 data, we compute the likelihood of card ownership in 1998. We
then order the 1998 bank cardholders and label those with the highest probabilities (up
to 57%) “existing cardholders” and the remaining 12.5% as “new cardholders.”42
Table 4 reports averages for several relevant household characteristics. The “new”
bank cardholders are riskier along a number of observable dimensions: they are less
likely to be married, have less education, lower income, and lower net worth.43 These
higher risk characteristics are reflected in both higher borrowing interest rates and delin-
quency rates for the “new” cardholders.
The new cardholders play a significant role in the rise in credit card borrowing. De-
spite their much lower average income, new cardholders accounted for roughly a quar-
ter of the total rise of credit card debt. As a result, their contribution to the rise in credit
card debt is proportionally larger than the rise in credit holders of roughly 20% (i.e.
12.5/57). The remainder of the rise was driven by the existing cardholders, whose av-
erage balance rose by roughly 60% (in 1998 dollars) from 1989 to 1998. Overall, this left
average real balances of all cardholders up by nearly 50% from 1989.
least 60 days late on a bill payment, which we use as a proxy for households at higher risk of bankruptcy.
Second, the largest rise in bankruptcy filings occurred during the 1990s, with the filing rate per adult
doubling between 1989 and 1998. Finally, both years correspond to similar points in the business cycle
(i.e. well into expansions and roughly 2 years before recessions) which controls for cyclical trends.
41We differ from Johnson (2007) in our focus on bank-issued cards (she includes other cards such as
store and gasoline cards) and the explanatory variables in the probits. We focus on bank cards since bank
cards issuers were heavy users (and innovators) of IT intensive contract design, and bank cards are more
widely used for short term borrowing than gas and store cards which typically have low credit limits.
42The ownership rates differ slightly from Table 3 since we focus on households under 65 with net
worth less than 5 million. See the web appendix for further details.
43These characteristics are associated with higher risks of bankruptcy, e.g. see Agarwal, Chomsiseng-
phet, and Liu (2011). See Moorman and Garasky (2008) for a review of work linking serious delinquency
to an increased probability of bankruptcy. Our conclusion that “new” credit card borrowers had riskier
observable characteristics is consistent with Black and Morgan (1999) and Johnson (2007).
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Table 4: Characteristics of Bank Card Holders, SCF
Characteristics 1989 1998 1998 1998
All cardholders All cardholders “Existing” “New”
Fraction HH 57.0 69.5 57.0 12.5
Income 68,343.1 64,824.9 73,041.1 27,277.6
Net Worth 26,4584.2 257,444.4 303,551.5 46,737.8
DSR∗ 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.21
Debt 61,599.7 71,584.3 82,521.2 21,603.0
CC Balance∗ 1,925.4 2,934.1 3,001.9 2,624.1
Own Home 75.4 74.0 80.1 44.9
Age (of HH head) 42.4 43.2 43.9 40.3
No HS Degree∗ 8.8 6.0 3.0 19.8
College Degree 44.3 45.8 51.8 18.4
Married 71.1 68.1 73.2 44.9
CC IR∗ NA 14.4 14.1 15.5
Delinquent 2.7 5.6 3.8 13.6
∗DSR = Debt Service Ratio, CC = credit card, IR = interest rate, HS = high school
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Survey of Consumer Finances. Values for 1989 are expressed in
1998 dollars using the CPI. Figures are averages using population weights for households, and rates are
as a fraction of the sample: households under 65 with a net worth of less than 5 million.
6.3 Increased Risk Based Pricing
A third key prediction of the model is that more contracts should be accompanied by
better risk-based pricing. To see whether credit card interest rates reflect household
risk more accurately, we compare the SCF distribution of interest rates for households
who report being sixty days late on at least one debt payment (delinquents) to non-
delinquents. While the distributions for delinquents and non-delinquents are nearly
identical in 1983 (Figure 7, Panel A), by 2001 the delinquent interest rate distribution
has shifted to the right of non-delinquents (Figure 7, Panel B). This suggests that interest
rates have become more closely related to borrowers’ default risk.
Several recent papers document similar findings. For example, Edelberg (2006) com-
bines data from the PSID and the SCF, and finds that lenders have become better at
identifying higher risk borrowers, and have made increased use of risk-based pricing.
The timing coincides with the observation that in the late 1980s some credit card banks
began to offer a wider variety of credit card plans “targeted at selected subsets of con-
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sumers, and many charge[d] lower interest rates” (Canner and Luckett 1992).44
7 The New Cardholders and the Rise in Bankruptcies
While the rise in credit card debt is often cited as a key cause of the surge in consumer
bankruptcies (e.g. see White (2007) and Mann (2006)), the quantitative importance of
the extension of cards to new (riskier) borrowers is not widely accepted. Instead, many
economists argue that bankruptcies rose primarily due to an intensive margin channel of
low risk borrowers taking on more debt (e.g., Narajabad (2012), Sanchez (2012)), or to a
fall in the cost of bankruptcy (often labeled stigma, see Gross and Souleles (2002)).
To quantify the contribution of the “new” credit card borrowers to the rise in bankruptcy,
we build on our decomposition of new versus existing borrowers in Section 6.2. For
reasons discussed in Section 6.2, we focus on the 1989-1998 period and use 60-day delin-
quency as a proxy for an increased risk of bankruptcy.
As an initial estimate of the new cardholder contribution, we compare the delin-
quency rates for five groups of borrowers: all, all cardholders, existing cardholders,
new cardholders, and households without a card (see Table 5). As in Section 6.2, we
divide cardholders into “new” and “existing” cardholders based on the likelihood of
households having a card in 1989. The (SCF sample) delinquency rate rose by 0.9 per-
centage points (from 6.4% to 7.3%) between 1989 and 1998, while the delinquency rate
for borrowers without a bankcard was unchanged at 11.4%. This suggests the rise in
delinquency was driven by cardholders. Existing cardholders account for roughly 70%
of the rise in delinquency: they are 57% of the sample population (see Table 4) and their
delinquency rate increased from 2.7 to 3.8 percent, which implies a 0.63 percentage point
rise in the aggregate delinquency rate. The remaining (roughly) 30% is attributable to the
new cardholders — a contribution of more than double their population share (12.5%).
At 13.6% in 1998, the delinquency rate of new cardholders was 2.2 percentage points
higher than that of households without a card, so that new cardholders contributed
0.275 (=2.2*0.125) to the 0.9 rise in the delinquency rate.
While suggestive, this calculation does not control for the expected delinquency of
new cardholders if they had not held a bank card. To address this, we compute the
predicted delinquency of cardholders. We estimate a probit of delinquency status on
44Furletti and Ody (2006) report credit card issuers have also increased fees on riskier borrowers.
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Table 5: Delinquency Rates, SCF
Group 1989 1995 1998
All 6.4 6.5 7.3
All cardholders 2.7 3.9 5.6
Existing 2.7 3.2 3.8
New 7.9 13.6
No Card 11.4 11.9 11.4
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Survey of Consumer Finances. Rates are as a fraction of the
(population weighted) sample: households under 65 with a net worth of less than $5,000,000.
household demographics, income, assets and debt measures using the 1989 SCF. Us-
ing the coefficients from 1989, we compute the predicted delinquency rates for 1998
and the counterfactual delinquency rate of the new cardholders if they had not gained
access to credit cards. The predicted rate for the new cardholders in 1998 is 12.4%, some-
what lower than their actual level of 13.6%. The counterfactual delinquency rate of these
households if they had not held credit cards (with their debt level and debt service ratios
correspondingly lower) is 10.7%. Accordingly, one can attribute a rise in the expected
probability of delinquency of roughly 1.7 percentage points (12.4% - 10.7%) to the ex-
tension of cards. Since new cardholders comprise 12.5% of the population, this estimate
implies that the extensive margin accounted for roughly a quarter (=0.125*1.7/0.9) of
the rise in delinquencies between 1989 and 1998.
In contrast to the conventional wisdom, our analysis thus finds the extension of credit
cards to “new,” riskier borrowers to be quantitatively important, accounting for between
a quarter and a third of the rise in defaults. To evaluate the role of increased debt (i.e., the
intensive margin) and lower default costs (stigma) in accounting for the remaining 70%,
we conduct a similar counterfactual for existing cardholders. Using the 1989 regression
coefficients to predict 1998 delinquency risk, we find a negligible role for changes in
demographics or debt, as the predicted delinquency level is 2.5% (slightly lower than
in 1989). Interestingly, despite our use of a different data source, our analysis is consis-
tent with Gross and Souleles (2002) who found that observed default probabilities in a
sample of credit card accounts from June 1995 to June 1997 jumped, even controlling for
household risk measures such as the credit score.
Our interest in underlying trends during the 1990s, combined with an attempt to
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control for business cycle effects, led us to focus on 1989 and 1998. The importance of
controlling for cyclical effects can be seen in Figure 1, as bankruptcies first peak and
then decline after the 1991 recession.45 A similar pattern holds for delinquencies, as the
(population) delinquency rate in the SCF in 1995 was only slightly above 1989’s (see Ta-
ble 5). Do the predictions of our model for the extensive margin hold in 1995? At first
glance, the answer appears to be no. Replicating our procedure to sort cardholders into
new and existing groups, we find a much lower delinquency rate for new cardholders
(at 7.9%) than in 1998. A closer look, however, suggests that cyclical factors (and rel-
atively new accounts) are important. Using the coefficients from the 1989 delinquency
regression, the predicted delinquency rate for the new cardholders is 13.7%, well above
the actual level of 7.9%. In other words, the observable characteristics of the new card-
holders in 1995 suggests that their delinquency rate was likely to rise – consistent with
the subsequent rise in delinquency and bankruptcy (see Figure 1).46
A potential concern is that 60-day delinquencies (our proxy for bankruptcies) may
overstate the contribution of the extensive margin. Although delinquency is correlated
with bankruptcy, the percentage rise in delinquencies is smaller than the rise in filings
during the 1980s and 1990s. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2010) and White (2007) sum-
marize empirical work finding that bankrupts in the late 1990s tended to have lower in-
come relative to the median household than bankrupts in the early 1980s. Given that the
new cardholders tended to have lower income than existing cardholders, the new card-
holders may well have had an even larger role in accounting for the rise in bankruptcies
than delinquencies.
8 Conclusion
Our findings support the view that financial innovations, based on improved informa-
tion technology, in the credit card market were a critical factor in the rise in unsecured
borrowing and bankruptcies during the 1980s and 1990s. The model analyzed in this
paper predicts that financial innovations lead to more credit contracts, with each con-
45Delinquency (bankruptcy) rates rise during recessions and then fall in the early years of an expansion
before rising again (Fieldhouse, Livshits, and MacGee (2013)).
46Although we examine bankcards, our results are broadly consistent with Johnson (2007) who finds
that new cardholders also had high delinquency rates. However, our conclusions on the extensive margin
differ from Black and Morgan (1999). This largely reflects their focus on the change in delinquency in the
SCF between 1989 and 1995.
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tract targeted at smaller groups, and to the extension of credit to riskier households.
As a result, financial innovations lead to higher aggregate borrowing and defaults. We
find that these predictions are remarkably consistent with changes in the aggregate and
cross-sectional pattern of borrowing and defaults in the U.S. since the late 1980s.
Our stylized model provides three channels (i.e. increases in α, decreases in χ or q¯)
via which “sufficiently large” financial innovations could contribute to the rapid rise in
bankruptcy and credit card borrowing during the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 1). While
we view all three channels as stemming from the same underlying force — improved in-
formation technology — they differ in their implications for overhead costs and default
rates. Based on these varying implications and the empirical evidence, we conclude that
it is unlikely that any single channel was the sole driving force.
The available data on aggregate overhead costs suggest that lower fixed costs are
unlikely to have been the only factor at work. The model predicts that reductions in
the fixed cost lower overhead costs as a percent of borrowing, while improvements in
signal accuracy or reduced costs of funds lead to higher overhead costs. The closest
empirical analog to overhead costs is the ratio of non-interest costs to total assets. Berger
(2003) reports that non-interest costs of U.S. commercial banks rose from roughly 3% of
total assets in the early 1980s to 3.5% by the mid 1990s. This is consistent with reduced
funding costs or with more accurate risk assessment, but not with lower fixed costs.
Similarly, improvements in signal accuracy have ambiguous effects on bankruptcies
per debtor. Such improvements may lower bankruptcies per borrower, as misclassifi-
cation of high-risk borrowers into low-risk types is reduced, thus lowering the average
bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Since bankruptcy and delinquency rates of credit card
holders increased during the 1980s and 1990s, we find it unlikely that improvements
in signal accuracy were the sole driving force. Finally, increased securitization does
not appear to be the main driving force either. To get a large increase in bankrupt-
cies through this channel, the cost of funds must decrease substantially. However, not
all credit lenders adopted securitization of credit card receivables as a funding source,
which suggests it did not have a large impact on funding costs. Summarizing, our in-
terpretation is that the most likely scenario is that all channels were simultaneously at
play. Quantifying the contribution of each channel is left for future work.
Finally, our analysis suggests that interpretations of the unsecured credit market us-
ing a “standard” competitive framework may be misleading. We find that even a small
fixed cost of creating a lending contract can lead to significant deviations from the pre-
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dictions of the standard competitive framework. Incorporating fixed costs into a quan-
titative model could be a promising avenue for future research.
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A Verifying Equilibrium under Incomplete Information
To verify that the allocation we have characterized is an equilibrium, we need to check
that a potential entrant cannot make positive profits by cream-skimming misclassified
borrowers (by offering them (q′, L′)— a smaller risky loan with a better interest rate).
The most profitable potential deviation makes the best customer indifferent between
(q′, L′) and the risk-free contract.47 Without loss of generality, u1(q
′, L′) = u1(q, γyl),
which implies
L′ =
q¯ − β
q′ − β
γyl. (A.1)
47Keeping the loan size fixed, any lower price would imply losing the best and most numerous cus-
tomers, while any higher price would be leaving too much surplus to borrowers.
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Equation (A.1) establishes a simple relation between q′ and L′. The search for the most
profitable deviation then amounts to searching over all possible q′. A single smaller
risky loan may attract borrowers from a number of bins, and we thus have to calculate
(and sum over) the profits generated from each of the equilibrium bins [σn, σn−1), for
n = 2, . . . , N . It is important to note that any contract that attracts misclassified borrow-
ers necessarily disrupts the existing contract (into which these borrowers were misclas-
sified). To see this, consider a contract (q′, L′) with L′ < γyh and q
′ > qn, which attracts
borrowers with ρ′ > ρˆn. Since ρ
′ prefers this contract to the risk-free contract, so will
every borrower with ρ < ρ′, including ρˆn. Since ρˆn is indifferent between the risk-free
contract and (qn, γyh), she strictly prefers (q
′, L′) to the existing contract (qn, γyh).
Thus, for a given q′, and existing bin [σn, σn−1) served by (qn, γyh), we have to con-
sider two possible scenario. First, the disruption to the existing contract may be small
enough that the incumbent lender chooses not to exit the market. This happens when
incumbent’s profit loss is smaller than χ. Second, if the profit loss from losing the best
(misclassified) customers is larger than χ, the incumbent lender will exit. Anticipating
this scenario, the entrant offers a replacement contract (q′n, γyh) to (correctly labeled)
customers with σ ∈ [σn, σn−1) in order to prevent them from applying for the (q
′, L′)
contract, which would make it unprofitable. If the entrant is unable to offer such a re-
placement contract, the entrant will avoid dealing with the bin [σn, σn−1) by setting the
eligibility requirement of the (q′, L′) contract to σ = σn−1.
We provide the details of the numerical implementation in a separate web appendix.
B Data Appendix
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 Figures 7 and 8(c) are based on data from the Survey of Consumer
Finances. More details are in the web appendix.
The Survey of Consumer Finances questions on the credit card interest rate of respon-
dents for 1995 - 2004 were for the card with the largest balance, while the 1983 survey
asked for the average annualized interest on the bank or store card used most often if
the full amount was not paid. When counting the number of different interest rates in
Table 2, we drop imputed values. The sample size increases, but by much less than the
reported number of different interest rates (see the web appendix for the sample size by
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year). In Figure 8(c), earned income isWages + Salaries + Professional Practice, Business,
Limited Partnership, Farm + Unemployment or Worker’s Compensation.
Figures 8(a) and 8(b) are based on surveys of banks administered by the Board of Gov-
ernors. The 24-months consumer loans series is available since February 1972 from the
Quarterly Report of Interest Rates on Selected Direct Consumer Installment Loans (LIRS) (item
LIRS7808). The survey asks for the most common (annual percentage) rate charged on
“other loans for consumer goods and personal expenditures (24-month).” It includes
loans for goods other than automobiles or mobile homes whether or not the loan is
secured. Home improvement loans and loans secured primarily by real estate are ex-
cluded. The sample declines from 296 banks in 1972 to 100 in 2007. The credit card
interest rate data series is TCCP6258 (including only nationally available plans), from
the bi-annual (since 1990) Terms of Credit Card Plans (TCCP). The annual response rates
range from 200 to 400.
Figure 2(a) Credit Scoring Keyword Count (trade and scholarly publications): We ac-
cessed the database “ProQuest” on June 22, 2013, chose the search subject area “Busi-
ness” and used the “Advanced Search” option, selecting only “Trade Journals” and
“Scholarly Journals.” We searched using the date range 01/01/1965 to 06/22/2013 (the
last ten years were not plotted to be consistent with other Figures). We searched for ar-
ticles containing at least one of the following phrases: “credit score”, “credit scores”, or
“credit scoring.” Hits were counted for every five-year period and plotted for themiddle
year of that period. To control for the increase in the total numbers of words over time,
we searched for “consumer credit” and “consumer credits in the same way, and then
divided the counts for the first search with those of the second. We further normalized
the resulting data series so that the count for the first data point (1965-1969), is one.
Figure 2(b) Normalized Credit Scoring Keyword Count (Google Scholar): The un-
derlying data was collected on January 27, 2012. We accessed “Google Scholar” using
advanced search and checking the option “Business, Administration, Finance, and Eco-
nomics.” The search was conducted for the keyword “credit scoring.” We searched us-
ing the data range 01/01/1965 to 31/12/2004. Hits were counted for every five-year
period and plotted for the middle year of that period. To normalize the data series, we
searched for “consumer credit.” For each year, we divided the counts for the “credit
scoring” search by those of the “consumer credit” search. Unfortunately, Google has
since revised the advanced search options, and removed the options we used.
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